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Introduction
Optical fiber communication offers an exciting alternative to traditional wire
communications. Extensive research over the past two decades helped in bringing down
the transmission loss in silica fiber close to its theoretical limit of about 0.2 dB/km.
However, the high density optical communication systems in the future would require
optical fibers with losses far below those of silica fibers. Many infrared transmitting
materials, such as heaw-metal oxides, halides, and chalcogenides, have the potential of
having losses below 0.01 dB/km _s_). Amongst these, heavy metal fluoride glasses based
on zirconium fluoride are most promising.
Fluorozirconate glasses have a broad transparency range, low refractive index,
small dispersion, low Rayleigh scattering, and ultra-low thermal dispersion. In addition to
fiber optics, they can be used in infrared remote sensing, laser power transmission, control
systems for nuclear power plants, and various other applications. They offer a great deal
of compositional flexibility, which could allow their properties to be tailored to a broad
range. Although the theoretically predicted loss factor in fluoride glasses is around 0.001
dB/km% the practical limitations in material purification brings this value up to around
0.02 dB/km.
Fluoride glasses have a narrow glass forming region. The large density difference
between different components could lead to rapid phase separation and crystallization in
these glasses under gravity. The microcrystaUites formed in these glasses during synthesis
or subsequent processing give rise to undesired scattering and higher than expected losses.
Presently the losses obtained in these glasses are in the range of 1 to 100 dB/km, with best
reported values of 0.7 to 0.9 dB/km c_,7_.
Previous studies of this nature (') were incomplete in that the researchers observed
no crystallization during flight. The conclusions drawn from that set of experiments noted
that several variables, including the temperature profile were inadequately controlled for
good scientific observations. The results did suggest that nucleation of microcrystallites
does have a strong dependency on the temperature gradient at the solidification interface
and any experimental work in this area needs to have that parameter under control.
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Description of Hardware Development Activities
Section A. SYNOPSIS OF THE GLASS ANNEALING FURNACE
The purpose of this KC-135 experiment is to determine the effects of gravity on
nucleation and growth of crystals in optical fiber. It is believed that in microgravity that
there will be an absence of nucleation and growth and that these phenomena will be
enhanced in the 2g portion of the parabola. The GAF will be used to anneal (not melt) the
fibers in either low or high gravity. During the annealing process the growth of crystals
maybe enhanced or retarded by the influence of gravity. The results of this experiment
will be used in the development of Space Shuttle experiment. This research is intended to
help develop a process to improve the transmission properties of commercial fiber optic
cables.
The optical glass fibers will be sealed within a quartz ampoule to prevent
deterioration from moisture while being heated. The ampoule is 60 mm long and 3 mm in
diameter.
Section B. TEST OBJECTIVES
To process approximately 30 samples total, 15 in low-g and 15 in high-g. Results
of the effects of low and high gravity upon crystal nucleation will be determined in the
laboratory at MSFC, Alabama.
Section C. TEST DESCRIPTION
For each run one quartz ampoule containing one 30 mm long optical grade quartz
fibers will be placed into the preheat furnace set to 300 ° C. At the appropriate time the
ampoule will then be pushed into the annealing furnace set to 400 ° C and allowed to heat
soak for approximately 10 seconds. Then it will be pushed into the quench chamber
where water will be sprayed onto it and rapidly quench the sample. Quartz is very
resistant to thermal shock at this low temperature, therefore the risk of the ampoule
shattering is very minimal. A 0.125" diameter stainless steel rod is used to secure the
ampoule and move or push the ampoule from one zone to the next in a straight line.
Section D. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION
The GAF is a relatively small package measuring 22"L x 10"W x 7.25"H and
weighs less than 25 pounds. Its basic components are two furnaces, a water quench
chamber and associated temperature control circuitry. The unit will be bolted down to a
framework assembly fabricated from AMCO Engineering Co. stock materials which will
act as a pedestal structure. This pedestal has flown twice in support of the KC-135 Fiber
Pulling Apparatus in the past. It's safety information is contained within documents
associated with the FPA experimental hardware and has already passed a JSC TRR.
Theexperimentprocessingareais containedwithin aPlexiglashousingandis
ventedto theaircraft'soverboarddumpsystem.Thedumpsystemis utilizedfor two
reasons:0) To provide a means of removing the 50 to 60 ml of quench water and @ to
maintain a slight negative pressure within the housing in the unlikely event that one of the
sample ampoules should break. If an ampoule should break then no further action would
be taken during that particular flight and the experiment would be shut down and recycled
on the ground.
The electrical system is comprised of two temperature control systems - one for
each furnace. An Omega model CN132 temperature controller will monitor the
temperature of the particular furnace and apply or remove power to the heating element
by controlling a International Rectifier solid stage relay model TD1225 which is rated to
25 amps. There is only one 7.5 amp circuit breaker switch to control power to the entire
system.
To quench the ampoule a 60 cc plastic syringe located outside the Plexiglas
housing is connected via a plastic hose to the brass quench chamber located within the
housing. The syringe contains only pure water and does not utilize any type of needle.
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Section E. STRUCTURAL LOAD ANALYSIS
Two simplified case studies are presented dealing with the heaviest objects and the
associated mounting points. The first case deals with the two bolts that mount the entire
assembly (25 pounds) to the top of the support structure. This support structure has been
flown aboard the KC-135 in the past for use with the Fiber Puller Apparatus and is
referred to as the pedestal.
The second case shows an analysis of the heaviest object (the annealing zone
furnace) and its associated hardware to the base plate. All total this item weighs 3.1
pounds and is the heaviest single item contained within the system.
It is our contention that these two studies represent the worst case conditions with
this hardware. It should be pointed out that the reactive moment arm is included in the
analysis with the center of gravity for the assembly at 3.5 inches up from the base plate, 9
inches from the left side and 5.5 inches from the front edge. It is assumed that the 9 g
load is applied in the X and Z directions simultaneously along with a 2 g load in the Y
direction.
Figures 2 and 3 provide sketches of the AMCO framework pedestal and where the
GAF system is located with respect to the pedestal. The pedestal was originally designed
to support the Fiber Puller Apparatus which weighed 146 pounds, therefore no structural
analysis is considered necessary for this application since the GAF only weighs 25 pounds.
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Case 1: Glass Annealing Furnace Assembly to the Pedestal Framework.
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TENSILE:
Figure 4: Top view of GAF assembly
X
The reactive moment arm is calculated for the total tensile created which is distributed by the
2 bolts that mount the 1/4 inch thick base plate to the support structure. The center of gravity
is located 9" on the X axis, 3.5" on the Y axis and 5.5" on the Z axis.
Tensile force for the free standing structure seeing 9 g's eyeballs in, out, left, or right and
simultaneously along with 2 g's eyeballs up pulling apart from the 1/4 inch thick base plate
will be:
Direct Tension: (25 lb. x 2 g's) / 2 bolts = 25 lb./fasmer
Moment from the X load:
M x = 25 lb. x 9 g's x 6.519" = 1,466.78 inlb
M z = 25 lb. x 9 g's x 9.657" = 2,172.83 inIb
Tension at "A" from MX:
TA = MX/(2 x 20")=1,466.78/(2x20") = 36.67 lb.
Tension at "A" from MZ:
TA = MZ/(2 x 20")=2,172.83/(2x20") = 54.32 lb.
Total Tension = 36.67 + 54.32 + 25 = 115.99 lb.
The3/8" stainlesssteelboltsusedareratedto 13,798lb. each.Theforceseenat 2 g's
eyeballsup is 113lb. poundsperbolt. Therefore,eachbolt is 13,798/116= 119times
strongerthanrequiredfor atensileforceof 2g's eyeballsupalongwith 9 g's eyeballsin, out,
left, or right.This valueis approximatesinceit doesnot takeinto accountshearor pre-
loadingof thebolt.
SHEAR:
Forthis case,primaryshearis consideredfor all boltsthatattachthebaseplateto thetop of
thepedestalframework. Shearstressseenacrossthemountingboltsat 9 g's eyeballsin, out,
left, or rightwill be:
DirectShear:(25lb. x (9z g's x 92 g's) _t2) / 2 bolts = 159.10 lb./fasmer
Total Shear = 159.10 lb.
Each bolt sees 159.10 pounds of direct shear force. The 3/8" stainless steel bolts used are
rated to a shear strength of 8,279 lb. each. Therefore, each bolt is 8,279/159 = 52 times
stronger than the shear forces expected at 9 g's eyeballs in, out, right or left. This value is
approximate since it does not take into account shear or pre-loading of the bolt.
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Case 2: Annealing Zone Furnace to the Base Plate
Figure 5: Top view of GAF assembly
The reactive moment arm is calculated for the total tensile created which is distributed by the
four 10-32 stainless steel screws that attach the furnace mounts to the base plate. The center
of gravity is located 2.5" on the X axis, 2" on the Y axis, and 2" on the Z axis.
Tensile force for the free standing structure seeing 9 g's eyeballs in, out, left, or right and
simultaneously along with 2 g's eyeballs up pulling apart from the 1/4 inch thick base plate
will be: (Assume moment ann is conservatively 4")
Direct Tension: (3.1 lb. x 2 g's) / 4 bolts = 1.55 lb./fastner
Moment from the X load:
M x = 3.1 lb. x 9 g's x 2" = 55.8 inlb
MZ = 3.1 lb. x 9 g's x 4" = 111.6 inlb
Tension at "A" from MX:
TA = M_/(2 x 3.75")= 55.8/(2x3.75") = 7.44 lb.
Tension at "A" from MZ:
T^ = MZ/(2 x 5")= 111.6/(2 x 5") = 11.16 lb.
Total Tension = 7.44 + 11.16 + 1.55 = 20.15 lb.
The 10-32 stainless steel screws used are rated to 3600 lb. each. The force seen at 2 g's
eyeballs up is 20.15 pounds per screw. Therefore, each screw is 3600/20.15 = 178 times
stronger than required for a pure tensile force of 2 g's eyeballs up simultaneously along with 9
11
g's eyeballsin, out,left, or right.Thisvalueisapproximatesinceit doesnot takeintoaccount
shearor pre-loadingof thescrew.
SHEAR:
Forthiscase,primaryshearis consideredfor all boltsthatattachthefumaceto thebaseplate.
Shearstressseenacrossthemountingboltsat9 g's eyeballsin, out,left, or right will be:
Direct Shear:(3.1lb. x (92g's x 92g's)_t2)/ 4 bolts = 9.86 Ib./fasmer
Total Shear = 9.86 lb.
Each 10-32 stainless steel screw sees 9.86 pounds of direct shear force. The screws used are
rated to a shear strength of 2,160 pounds each (60% of the tensile). Therefore, each screw is
2,160/9.86 = 219 times stronger than the shear forces expected at 9 g's eyeballs in, out, right
or left. This value is approximate since it does not take into account tensile or pre-loading of
the screw.
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SectionF. ELECTRICAL LOAD ANALYSIS
This systemuses120volts 60Hz. AC only. A single 30 foot long 18 gauge power
cord provides the AC power interface to the experiment. Total load for the experiment will
be 5.0 amps maximum during the furnace heat up and will subsequently become intermittent
once the furnace has reached temperature. The temperature controllers use timed
proportioned control of the power to regulate temperature. Maximum current draw is limited
by the resistance of approximately 50 ohms for each heating element.
The Omega model CN132 temperature controller maximum power draw is 2.5 watts
and is internally protected with a 100 milliamp fuse.
On the following page is Figure 6 which identifies the AC power circuits, main power
switch which is also a circuit breaker and wire gauges. Except for the power cord all wiring is
TFE insulation and rated to 175 ° C. The 30 gauge thermocouple wire is insulated with glass
braid insulation.
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Section G. PRESSURE VESSEL CERTIFICATION
No pressure vessels are contained within the system.
Section H. IN FLIGHT TEST PROCEDURES
During level flight one quartz ampoule will be removed from the supply case and
inserted into the end of the push rod. With the access door closed, the ampoule will be
loaded into the preheat furnace set at 300 ° C and allowed to heat soak for at least 5
minutes. Upon entering a low or high-g period the ampoule will then be pushed or loaded
into the annealing furnace set to 400°C and allowed to heat soak for 10 to 15 seconds.
At the end of this time period the ampoule will then be pushed into the water quench
chamber. Here the 50 to 60 milliliters of pure water will be sprayed onto the ampoule by
the plastic syringe and thus rapidly cool down the sample.
To recycle the experiment a new ampoule and plastic syringe filled with water will
be installed during level or high-g flight.
Section I. PARABOLA REQUIREMENTS
During sample loading and unloading procedures a period of 1 to 2 minutes of
high-g or level flight is all that is required. Only one parabola is needed to process anyone
sample and can occur anytime after the required preheat period. It is hoped that 5 to 10
samples per flight can be processed.
Section J. TEST SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS, GROUND AND FLIGHT
There are only two test support requirements: 03 The 110 Volt AC, 60 Hz.
aircraft power be supplied at least 30 minutes prior to take off to allow the furnaces to
heat up, and ® the overboard dump be available during the flight period. The air flow rate
of the dump will be meter through the use of a ball valve and will not be operated in a full
flow condition.
This project is unclassified and has no security restrictions.
Section K. DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
No data acquisition connections are required to be made to JSC equipment.
Section L. TEST OPERATING LIMITS OR RESTRICTIONS
An overboard dump system must be available for venting the quench water and
provide a slight negative pressure inside the experiment housing for safety reasons.
Intermittent power glitches do not pose any problems with the hardware.
Section M. PROPOSED MANIFEST FOR EACH FLIGHT
Two people are required to operate this experiment per mission. No JSC
personnel are required.
Section N. PHOTOGRAPHIC REQUIREMENTS
There are no specific photographic requirements, occasional video and/or still
photos for documentation may be requested as needed.
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SectionO. HAZARD ANALYSIS
Thefollowing pagesdetailsidentifiedhazardsassociatedwith thisexperiment.
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HAZARD REPORT NUMBER ONE
HAZARD TITLE: Glass fragments
DESCRIFHON OF HAZARD: Breakage of the quartz glass ampoule causing it to free
float and possibly become a hazard to personnel.
HAZARD CAUSE: Thermal shock in association with a manufacturing defect to the
glass ampoule.
HAZARD CONTROL:
1. Completely contain the experiment in Plexiglas so that the ampoule material can not
escape.
2. Implement overboard dump system to maintain slight negative pressure on experiment
housing and vent the Plexiglas housing continuously.
3. Keep access doors closed during parabolas.
VERIFICATION METHOD:
1. Visual inspection.
2. Proper procedure during operation.
3. Proper procedure during operation.
VERIFICATION STATUS:
1. Inspection complete - no means for the ampoule fragments to escape with the access
door closed.
2. Real time operational procedures.
3. Real time operational procedures.
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HAZARD REPORT NUMBER TWO
HAZARD TITLE: Implosion of the Plexiglas housing.
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: Possible injury to personnel due to Plexiglas fragments.
HAZARD CAUSE: The overboard dump valve is fully opened creating too great a
vacuum within the experiment housing.
HAZARD CONTROL: Insure that the Plexiglas housing is not air tight and thus
preclude the possibility of vacuum build up.
VERIFICATION METHOD: Inherent to the design.
VERIFICATION STATUS: Inspection complete - There are sufficient air leaks through
the Velcro seals on the Plexiglas access door and through the housing vent port to prevent
excessive vacuum build up.
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HAZARD REPORT NUMBER THREE
HAZARD TITLE: Sharp comers and protrusions on the hardware.
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: Injury to personnel due to contacting sharp comers, or
protrusions during fight.
HAZARD CONTROL:
1. Insure that all sharp comers that are exposed have been rounded to a radius of no less
than 0.250".
2. Add foam rubber padding as required to satisfy safety requirements at Ellington Air
Field, JSC.
VERIFICATION METHOD:
1. Visual inspection of hardware.
2. Visual inspection of hardware.
VERIFICATION STATUS:
1. Complete - All exposed comers have been rounded to a 0.250" radius.
2. Not complete - To be determined at Ellington Air Field during the TRR.
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HAZARD REPORT NUMBER FOUR
HAZARD TITLE: Electrical shorts or electrical shock.
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: Water from the quench system resulting in electrical
shorting to the system or to personnel.
HAZARD CAUSE: Free floating water from the quench zone within the experiment
housing coming in contact with electrical systems.
HAZARD CONTROL:
1. Protect all electrical connections from water.
2. Keep plumbing to a minimum around electronics.
3. Use the minimum amount of water necessary.
4. Use overboard dump to catch and remove quench water from the quench chamber.
VERIFICATION METHOD:
1. Visually inspect electrical connections to see if they are shielded from the water spray.
2. Visually check placement of quench system plumbing.
3. Visually inspect the amount of water needed and verify that this amount is used.
4. Proper procedure during in flight operations.
VERIFICATION STATUS:
1. All electrical connections are protected from water spray.
2. Quench system plumbing isolated from electronics where possible.
3. Smallest quantity of water (60 cc) is used for the quench system and is limited by the
size of the plastic syringe.
4. Real time operational procedures.
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HAZARD REPORT NUMBER FIVE
HAZARD TITLE: Touch Temperature
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: Surface temperature of the quartz ampoule exceeding
45°C.
HAZARD CAUSE: During removal of quartz ampoule from the quench chamber after
processing the surface temperature could still possibly exceed 45°C causing possible bum
hazard to personnel.
HAZARD CONTROL: Use quenching water in conjunction with air flow provided by
the overboard dump to cool the sample down to below 45°C prior to removal from the
quench chamber.
VERIFICATION METHOD: Ground based in lab testing to confirm that the above
hazard control is sufficient.
VERIFICATION STATUS: Lab tests were conducted to date prove the above hazard
control is sufficient to prevent possible bum hazard to personnel.
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HAZARD REPORT NUMBER SIX
HAZARD TITLE: Fire Potential of the Two Furnaces
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: Flammability assessment of furnace materials
HAZARD CAUSE: Flammability of materials used in the construction of the two
furnaces.
HAZARD CONTROL: Insure that materials used in the construction of the two furnace
do not pose an ignition source.
VERIFICATION METHOD: Insure that materials used do not pose a ignition source.
The following provides a material list and associated flammability of all components used
in the construction of each fumace starting with the inner most component and working
outward. The following picure indicates location of each item within the furnace.
1 f
7. , "',\ "\\'"\\,.'."\-"
z,z \\\\\\ \\,, \_,.,\,
 cccccccc<< c-c cccccccccccccccc 
_. ,\ \\ .-.-\\ --\\ --\
_,, \\\ \\ \\ \
__\_L\\Z\\)L\\_. LQ _,
__////////////////////_
Materials list for components used in the construction of each furnace.
Item Flammability
1. Alumina tubing, A1203
2. Nichrome heating element wire
3. Lava stone insulators, A1604.Si204
.
,
Norton's EA-139 potting compound, A1203*3H20 + MgO
Kaowool fiber insulation, A1203*2SiO2o2H2OeMnO2
0
0
0
606 l-T6 Aluminum end plates
0
5. 0
6. Ceramic bead insulators, A1203 0
7. 6061-T6 Aluminum tube, 4" O.D. 0
0
VERIFICATION STATUS: By inspection the above table indicates that none of the
materials used in the construction present any type of ignition source.
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HAZARD REPORT NUMBER SEVEN
HAZARD TITLE: Fire Potential of Electrical Components
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: Flammability assessment of electrical components
HAZARD CAUSE: Flammability of materials used in the temperature control system.
HAZARD CONTROL: Insure that materials used in the construction of the temperature
control system do not pose an ignition source.
VERIFICATION METHOD: The following provides a material list and associated
information.
°
o
Materials list used in the temperature control system
Item
Omega CN 132 temperature controller
2 each
International Rectifier solid state relay,
model TD1225, 2 each
3. Teflon coated wire, 22 and 18 gauge
Plexiglas housing, MC grade acrylic
used in protecting electronics from
quench water.
°
Material Specifications
Conformity testing to UL873,
CSA22.2/142-87, IEC664:1980, All
external moldings fabricated from flame
retardant polycarbonate.
Outer case fabricated from GE Valox,
electrical components contained within
Hysol two component epoxy resin. Both
materials meet UL94V-O flammability
spec.
Rated to 175°C
Flammability class UL94HB, Horizontal
burning test avg. burn rate per ASTM
D635 is 1.0 in/rain. Max. recommended
continuos service temp per ASTM D648
was 190°F
VERIFICATION STATUS: By inspection all of the above materials with the exception
of the Plexiglas meet flammability requirements.
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HAZARD REPORT NUMBER EIGHT
HAZARD TITLE: Smoke and or Fire
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD: Flammability of Plexiglas housing
HAZARD CAUSE: Overheating of Plexiglas caused by contacting hot quartz or
overheating of the solid state relays which are mounted directly to Plexiglas panel.
HAZARD CONTROL:
1. Use of the over board dump will help to preclude any chance of a hot (400°C) quartz
ampoule or pieces of ampoule from coming in contact with Plexiglas surfaces.
2. Ampoules will be contained at any point of time while hot within either furnace
housing or quench chamber and thus preclude any change of contact with the
Plexiglas.
3. If solid state relay should fail and overheat remove power from system by manually
tripping circuit breaker if breaker fails to trip automatically.
4. If a catastrophic failure did occur resulting in a fire Halon fire extinguishers are
available within easy reach on board the KC-135.
VERIFICATION METHOD:
1. Proper procedure during in fright operations.
2. By inspection confLrm that ampoules can not escape furnace housings.
3. Proper procedure during in flight operations.
4. By inspection determine ff fire extinguishers are available on board the KC-135.
VERIFICATION STATUS:
1. Real time operational procedures by the operator.
2. Inspection complete - ampoules can not escape furnace housing.
3. Real time operational procedures by the operator.
4. Inspection complete - fire extinguishers are standard equipment on hoard the KC-135.
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